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Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of entry regulations and ﬁring costs on cross-country
diﬀerences in income and productivity. We construct a general equilibrium industry-
dynamics model and quantitatively evaluate it using the cross-country data on entry costs
and ﬁring costs. Entry costs lower overall productivity in an economy by keeping low-
productivity establishments in operation and making the establishment size ineﬃciently
large. Firing costs lower productivity by reducing the reallocation of labor from low-
productivity establishments to high-productivity establishments. The linear regression
of the data on the model prediction accounts for 27% of the cross-sectional variation in
total factor productivity. Moving the level of entry costs and ﬁring costs from the U.S.
level to that of the average of low income countries (countries with a Gross National
Income below 2% of the U.S. level) reduces TFP by 27% in the model without capital,
and by 34% in the model with capital and capital adjustment costs.
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11 Introduction
Continuous reallocation is an important feature of well-functioning market economies. Pro-
duction resources are reallocated from low-productivity production units to high-productivity
production units, promoting aggregate productivity growth. Recent empirical studies docu-
ment that this process is quantitatively very important. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan (2001, Table 8.4) attribute about half of the multifactor productivity growth in
the U.S. manufacturing sector during 1977-1987 to the reallocation of production resources
across plants: 34% due to the change in output shares across plants and 24% due to the
entry and exit of plants. In a cross-country context, therefore, barriers to factor reallocations
can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) in each
country.
In this paper, we make an attempt to quantify the eﬀects of barriers to factor reallocations
on aggregate TFP. Many researchers attribute the main cause of the large diﬀerences in per-
capita income across countries to diﬀerences in TFP.1 One important research question is
how institutional and policy diﬀerences contribute to the TFP diﬀerences.
Our main purpose and contribution here is that we provide a benchmark regarding how
particular barriers to factor reallocations can aﬀect the measured aggregate TFP. Our paper
provides a benchmark in two respects. First, we use a version of arguably the most commonly
used industry dynamics model by Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
Second, we consider two frictions that directly impact the reallocation process and are also
quantitatively measurable: entry costs and ﬁring costs. In addition, by considering both
frictions at the same time, we provide a quantitative sense of how these two frictions work
together. Although our model is very simple and the frictions that we highlight are limited
for the purpose of capturing all of the mechanisms that hinder reallocations in reality, we
believe that starting with a simple benchmark would beneﬁt a future study with a richer
environment.
1See, for example, Klenow and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (1997).
2The following is the summary of our quantitative results. The linear regression of the
data on the model prediction accounts for 27% of the cross-sectional variation in total factor
productivity. Moving the level of entry costs and ﬁring costs from the U.S. level to that of
the average of low income countries (countries with a Gross National Income below 2% of
the U.S. level) reduces TFP by 27% in the model without capital and by 34% in the model
with capital and capital adjustment costs. In the model without capital, moving only the
entry costs from the U.S. level to the level of the average of low income countries reduces
TFP by 21% and moving only the ﬁring costs reduces TFP by 7%. Because (1 − 0.27) is
larger but very close to (1 − 0.21) × (1 − 0.07), it turns out that these two eﬀects essentially
do not interact—they neither amplify nor mitigate each other’s eﬀect.
One important aspect of our analysis is that we exclusively focus on the formal sector.
It is well known that in many poor countries there is a large informal sector.2 Studies
such as Erickson (2004) and D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2010) take the existence of an
informal sector seriously. Some aspects of our measure of barriers—for example, the cost
of legal registration—do not apply to ﬁrms in the informal sector. We focus on the formal
sector not because we believe that the informal sector is unimportant, but because we view
this analysis as a benchmark. The mechanisms that we highlight are: (i) high entry costs
reduce entry, reduce exits of ineﬃcient establishments, and allow establishments to operate
at an ineﬃciently large scale; and (ii) high ﬁring costs hinder the reallocation of labor from
low-productive establishments to high-productive establishments. To the extent that the
existence of an informal sector alleviates the eﬀect of these barriers, one can view that our
results are providing an upper bound for these particular mechanisms.
Another important aspect is that we are focusing only on these two particular frictions.
One can expect that incorporating additional types of frictions would further account for the
poor performance of those countries in which the economy tends to be heavily regulated.
Several recent studies, such as Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson
2See, for example, La Porta and Shleifer (2008).
3(2008), analyze how the costs of reallocation aﬀect aggregate TFP. Here we consider a
benchmark model with directly measured barriers for many countries. In these past studies,
the barriers are hypothetically given in the model (Restuccia and Rogerson) or measured as
“wedges” compared to the frictionless allocation (Hsieh and Klenow).3 We utilize the direct
measures of these barriers from the World Bank’s “Doing Business” dataset. We take the
entry and exit process seriously by building a model with endogenous entry and exit, whereas
the aforementioned two studies assume exogenous entry and exit. We focus on the problem
of labor reallocation, in contrast to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) who mainly analyze capital
reallocation. Labor income accounts for a larger portion of aggregate income, implying that
labor reallocation can potentially be very important.
A few other recent papers also examine the eﬀect of entry costs in industry-dynamics
models using the “Doing Business” dataset. Poschke (2009b) considers a model with tech-
nology choice upon entry and with product diﬀerentiation. He shows that a model with the
technology choice and product diﬀerentiation exhibits a large eﬀect of entry costs on pro-
ductivity. His analysis focuses on the productivity diﬀerences between the U.S. and Europe.
In contrast, our paper analyzes all of the countries in the dataset, and in particular focus
on low-income countries. Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011) analyze a model similar to ours,
but there are diﬀerences in the details of the model setups, and they employ a diﬀerent cali-
bration strategy. We consider endogenous labor supply while in their model labor supply is
ﬁxed. They do not analyze the eﬀect of capital adjustment costs. Both Poschke (2009b) and
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011) consider only entry costs and do not consider ﬁring costs.
We consider both costs simultaneously and ﬁnd that these two essentially do not interact.
Barseghyan (2006) also constructs a model to analyze the eﬀects of entry costs on TFP.
Ebell and Haefke (2009) and Felbermayr and Plat (2007) analyze the eﬀect of entry costs on
the unemployment rate, using the “Doing Business” dataset. Marimon and Quadrini (2006)
also analyze the eﬀect of entry costs on cross-country income diﬀerences. Their mechanism is
3Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2008) conduct an analysis similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for a large
set of countries.
4very diﬀerent from ours—they emphasize that with a lower entry cost, a new ﬁrm demands
a higher level of human capital, and this in turn encourages the innovators to accumulate
more human capital. Messina (2006) analyzes the eﬀect of entry costs on the structural
transformation in developed countries.
The analysis of entry costs is motivated by a large literature in development economics
which emphasizes the importance of entry regulations. For example, Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), using an earlier version of the “Doing Business”
dataset, describe how entry regulations (taking many forms) diﬀer across countries. Starting
from de Soto’s (1989, 2000) inﬂuential study, it has been argued that these diﬀerences in
entry costs have important implications for cross-country diﬀerences in income and produc-
tivity. However, economists have not reached a consensus on the quantitative importance
of these costs. We construct a general equilibrium model of industry dynamics, based on
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), to quantitatively evaluate the eﬀect of these costs in a
standard framework of industry dynamics.4
In our analysis, we consider two diﬀerent types of entry costs. First is the monetary cost
of starting up: this includes the monetary cost of legal registration, which was 31 times the
monthly minimum wage in de Soto’s (2000) garment workshop. Second is the time cost of
red tape—in many developing countries it takes time to legally start up a new operation.
De Soto (2000) documents that, for example, registering a small garment workshop with
one worker in Peru took 289 days with six hours of work every day. This is a substantial
amount of labor cost. In the benchmark Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) model, entry costs
lower overall productivity of the economy by allowing low-productivity establishments to
survive and making the establishment size ineﬃciently large. We show that this eﬀect can
be quantitatively substantial in countries with extremely high entry costs.
In most of this paper, we consider an establishment to be the fundamental production
4Note that de Soto (1989, 2000) emphasizes the importance of legal institutions and the enforcement of
property rights, rather than the particular mechanism that we highlight. Models with informality, such as
Erickson (2004) and D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2010), are a more appropriate framework for analyzing
de Soto’s hypothesis.
5unit. This is a natural choice given the description of the entry cost data (the entry cost
has to be paid for each location of production). Many empirical studies in development
economics, some of which we compare with our model in Section 6, deal with the ﬁrm-level
data. The distinction between an establishment and a ﬁrm can be an important distinction to
make when the ownership structure is crucial –for example, in the analysis credit constraints.
In our analysis, the ownership structure is not essential, and we focus on the establishment
level.
The eﬀects of the ﬁring cost have been extensively analyzed in the macroeconomics lit-
erature, starting with Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
The previous analyses, however, have almost exclusively focused on comparisons of U.S. and
European labor markets. Also in contrast to our motivation, the past analyses emphasize
the employment eﬀect of ﬁring costs rather than the productivity eﬀects.5 Lagos (2006)
points out that labor market policies such as ﬁring costs can aﬀect measured aggregate TFP.
Samaniego (2006b) considers the eﬀect of ﬁring costs on technology adoption and Poschke
(2009a) analyzes the eﬀect on aggregate productivity growth. Poschke (2009a) utilizes an
endogenous growth model, focusing on the eﬀect on growth. In contrast, we aim at quan-
tifying the level eﬀect. His experiment is only for the case of a ﬁring cost equivalent to
one year’s worth of wages, while we consider various levels of ﬁring costs that appear in the
“Doing Business” dataset. Koeniger and Prat (2007) analyzes the eﬀect of ﬁring costs (in
addition to entry costs and ﬁxed costs) on ﬁrm and job turnover in a matching model of
unemployment. In our dataset (which is described in Section 2), we see that several poor
countries have extremely large ﬁring costs. This suggests that ﬁring costs may be an impor-
tant source of low TFP in some countries. In our model, ﬁring costs lower productivity by
reducing the reallocation of labor from low-productivity establishments to high-productivity
establishments. We show that a large ﬁring cost can have a quantitatively signiﬁcant eﬀect
on TFP.
5Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) do analyze the productivity eﬀects, although their emphasis is more on
the employment eﬀect. In footnote 24, we compare our results with theirs in detail.
6For most of this paper, we assume that the labor is the only input of production. In
Section 5, we brieﬂy analyze a model with capital stock, which is similar to Veracierto
(2001). There, the role of capital adjustment costs is highlighted.
Our analysis provides a strong prediction regarding the establishment size distribution.
In Section 6, we compare our prediction to studies of ﬁrm size distribution. As we discuss
there, the results are mixed. This calls for further investigation into the study of ﬁrm size
and establishment size distribution in developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the “Doing Business”
dataset and provide a overview of the entry costs and ﬁring costs across countries. Section 3
sets up the model and calibrates it to the U.S. data as the benchmark. Section 4 describes the
results. In Section 5, we extend the model to include the capital stock. Section 6 compares
the model outcome to the cross-country micro-level data. Section 7 concludes.
2 Entry frictions and ﬁring costs around the world
We utilize the “Doing Business” dataset (2008) created by the World Bank, which measures
diﬀerent aspects of business regulations across countries. The information collected covers a
wide variety of regulations having to do with opening, operating, and closing a business. It
measures the cost in resources, time, and the number of procedures related to these regula-
tions. An attractive aspect of this database is its international comparability, achieved by
reporting the cost of the opening, operating and closing of a standardized ﬁrm, which is set
up in the same way across countries.
Figure 1 plots6 our entry cost measures against Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.7
The GNI per capita is scaled relative to the U.S. GNI per capita. The entry cost consists of
two parts: the cost of starting (incorporating) a business (left panels) and the cost of dealing
with licenses (right panels). Each cost consists of two parts: the time spent (upper panel)
6All variables in this section are log-transformed, except for the ﬁring cost measures. Firing cost measures
are presented in levels because they include many zeros. The lines in the ﬁgures are OLS regression lines.
7In all of the ﬁgures in this section, the tail of the distribution is cut out for the presentation. They are















































































































Figure 1: Time and cost of starting a business and dealing with licenses, against Gross
National Income (GNI) per capita. The left panels plot the cost of starting a business, and
the right panels plot the cost of dealing with licenses. The upper panels are the time spent
(days) and the lower panels are the monetary cost (as a % of GNI per capita). Source: Doing
Business 2008, World Bank.
8and the monetary cost (lower panel). The monetary cost is represented as a % of GNI per
capita. It can be seen from the ﬁgure that all entry cost measures have negative correlations
with GNI per capita.
We consider the “time” for starting business and dealing with licences to be an important
part of the entry cost. As is discussed in de Soto’s (2000) garment workshop experiment, the
“time” is not just a waiting time but rather the ﬁrm has to actively work on the procedures.
When we calculate the correlation coeﬃcient between the sum of the “time” measures of the
entry cost and the number of procedures necessary to start a business (which is also available
in the “Doing Business” dataset), it turns out to be 0.4.8 This positive relationship suggests
that the “time” reﬂects the amount of work that is required. In the quantitative model, we
assume that the period “one day” here implies the cost equivalent to the labor cost (wage)
of one worker for one day.
There is substantial variation in these entry cost measures across countries. In the U.S.,
the monetary cost of starting is eﬀectively zero (0.7% of per-capita GNI). In some countries,
this cost is considerable: in Sierra Leone the cost is over 1,000% of per-capita GNI, and in
Congo and Liberia it is close to 500% of per-capita GNI. In the U.S. the time period for
starting a business is six days. In some countries, it can take a very long time: in Suriname,
it takes more than two years to complete the process of starting a business.
The cost of obtaining a license—which is a cost of setting up a warehouse, including
obtaining the necessary licenses and permits, completing required notiﬁcations and inspec-
tions, and obtaining utility connections—also displays large diﬀerences. The monetary cost
is negligible in the U.S., at 13% of per-capita income. This has even larger variation than the
start-up cost: in Liberia it costs more than 600 times per-capita income, and in Zimbabwe
it costs more than 100 times per-capita income. The time cost is also substantial in some
countries. In Haiti, it takes more than 1,000 days.
In Figure 2, we add up (after adjusting for units) all of the costs in Figure 1. This is the
































Figure 2: Total entry cost in wage units, against GNI per capita. Source: Doing Business
2008, World Bank.
entry cost measured in units of annual wages. Here, the monetary costs are interpreted as
% of the wage rather than % of the GNI per capita (as in the actual data), so it deviates
from the actual cost by as much as the wage deviates from the GNI per capita. However,
we believe that this is a fairly good approximation.9 We denote this as κ in the following.
Therefore, the entry cost is κw, where w is the annual wage.
For the ﬁring costs, we use the direct measure that is included in the “Doing Business”
dataset. This measures the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments, and
9In the model’s calibration, the benchmark value of total earnings per period is 0.6 times the wage (in the
benchmark, the level of employment is set at 0.6). Because the benchmark labor share is 0.64, output (which
corresponds to the GNI per capita here) equals total earnings times 1/0.64, which is about 94% of the wage.









































Figure 3: Firing costs in yearly wages, against GNI per capita. Source: Doing Business 2008,
World Bank.
penalties due when terminating a worker. It is measured in units of weekly wages in the
dataset, and we convert it to annual wages. We denote it τ. Firing costs (τ) also have an
interesting pattern when plotted against income. That relationship is shown in Figure 3.
The correlation of τ and per capita GNI is negative. At an extreme, it is not possible to ﬁre
workers in Bolivia and Venezuela. Firing a worker requires more than 8 years of wages in
Zimbabwe. In the U.S., the ﬁring cost is zero. The median value of τ is 0.7 and the mean
value is 1.0.10
Finally, the correlation coeﬃcient between log(κ) and τ is 0.31.11 This implies that
10In calculating the mean value, we replaced “not possible to ﬁre” with τ = 10.
11This is statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level.
11although the correlation is positive, a high-κ country does not necessarily correspond to a
high-τ country.
3 Model
In this section, we describe our quantitative model which is based on Hopenhayn and Roger-
son (1993). Given that our aim is at providing the benchmark result for a standard model of
industry dynamics, we construct the model as closely as possible to the setting of Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993). One big departure is the introduction of the random ﬁxed operating
cost, which is necessary in order to match the exit pattern seen in the data.
Time is discrete, with one period set to be one year. There are two kinds of entities in
the economy: establishments and consumers. The establishments produce the consumption
goods for the consumers. The consumers supply labor (the only production factor in this
section) to the establishments. The consumers also own the establishments and receive
proﬁts. We consider this to be our benchmark and we compute the outcome country by
country. We add capital to the model in Section 5. There, due to computational complexity,
we will consider a “representative country” in each income group.
3.1 Establishments
Here we describe the behavior of the establishments. First, we describe the timing of incum-
bent establishments. Then, we describe the entrants’ timing.
An incumbent establishment begins period t with the individual state (st−1,nt−1). st−1
is the productivity level of the establishment in period t− 1. nt−1 is its employment level in
period t−1. The value function of an establishment at this stage is denoted as W(st−1,nt−1).
First, the incumbent draws the ﬁxed cost that is required for continuing the operation,
cf. cf is an i.i.d. random variable with the distribution ξ(cf).12 After observing cf, the
12This type of randomness is necessary in order to obtain a realistic exit pattern. See the discussions in Lee
and Mukoyama (2008). Samaniego (2006a) made this point earlier. Samaniego (2008) also considers a similar
setup.
12establishment decides whether to exit. We assume that there is a ﬁring cost (in consumption
goods) of the amount τwmaxh0,nt−1 − nti (where τ ≥ 0 and w is the annual wage rate), so
an exiting establishment has to pay τwnt−1 for adjusting employment down to zero.13 τ ≥ 0
corresponds to the ﬁring cost measure that is described in Section 2. As in Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), we treat the ﬁring cost as a tax that is transferred back to the consumers
in a lump-sum manner. Below we consider only the steady state of the aggregate economy,
and thus w is a constant value over time.
If the establishment decides to stay, it pays cf and observes the current period’s pro-
ductivity st. The distribution of st given st−1 is expressed by the conditional distribution
η(st|st−1). The value function at this point is denoted as V (st,nt−1). Then the establishment
decides the amount of employment in the current period, nt, and produces. The production
function is f(nt,st), which is increasing and concave in nt.
To enter, the entrant has to pay ce + κw units of consumption goods as an entry cost,
where ce can be interpreted as the sunk investment. κ ≥ 0, which is completely wasted,14
measures the additional entry barrier in units of annual per capita wages15—this is the entry
cost measured in Section 2. Next, the entrant draws the initial productivity st from the
distribution ν(st). Then it decides the employment nt and produces.









V (st,nt−1) = max
nt
{f(st,nt) − wnt − τwmaxh0,nt−1 − nti + βW(st,nt)}.
Here, β is the discount factor. Let the decision rule of nt be nt = φ(st,nt−1). Also deﬁne
13A more realistic treatment would be to consider diﬀerent ﬁring costs for short- and long-term workers.
14An alternative view of the entry cost is that it is a pure transfer, as in the “grabbing hand” theory of
Shleifer and Vishny (1998). Our assumption that κ is a pure waste is another sense in which the model
provides an upper bound on the eﬀect of κ.
15Note that the wage is here only for measurement purposes—the additional cost is κw units of the con-
sumption good, not κ units of labor.
13the decision rule for exiting as χ(st−1,nt−1,cf): χ(st−1,nt−1,cf) = 1 when exiting and
χ(st−1,nt−1,cf) = 0 when staying.




We assume free entry, therefore
V e = ce + κw (1)
holds in an equilibrium with positive entry.
3.2 Consumers








where E[·] is the expectation operator, Ct is consumption, and Lt is labor supply. The
consumer’s discount factor is the same as the establishment’s discount factor in the steady
state where Ct is constant. This form of the utility function is extensively used in the Real
Business Cycles literature with indivisible labor (e.g. Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)),
and also used by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). We focus on the steady state below, so
we express both by β. A is a constant parameter. The budget constraint is
Ct = wtLt + Πt + Tt, (2)
where wt is the wage at time t, Πt is the total proﬁt, and Tt is the lump-sum rebate of the





From here, we will focus on the stationary equilibrium where all of the aggregate variables
are constant. Total proﬁt is given by (Mt denotes the mass of entrants at period t)
Πt = Yt − wtLt − Ft − Tt − Mt(ce + κwt), (4)




and µ(st,nt−1) is the (stationary) distribution of establishments that are going to produce
at period t (including the new entrants, whose nt−1 = 0). Tt is the total ﬁring tax, which is
the sum of the ﬁring tax paid by the establishments which produce in period t, T
p
t , and the









τwt maxh0,nt−1 − φ(st,nt−1)idµ(st,nt−1).
From stationarity, Tx






Mt is the total number of entrants. The total operation cost Ft can be calculated by
Ft = Ft+1 =
Z Z
cf(1 − χ(st,φ(st,nt−1),cf))dξ(cf)dµ(st,nt−1).
From (2), (3), and (4),
wt
Yt − Ft − Mt(ce + κwt)
= A (5)




Because the establishment’s decision rules are only aﬀected by wt, we can solve the Bell-
man equations and obtain the equilibrium wt from (1). Given the decision rules obtained
from the optimization, we can calculate µ(st,nt−1) for any given number of entering establish-
ments. Let µ1(st,nt−1) be the stationary distribution when the mass of entrants is assumed
to be one. Then, µ(st,nt−1) = Mtµ1(st,nt−1) holds. Therefore, given the decision rules and
wt, (5) pins down the equilibrium value of Mt.
153.4 Calibration
We set one period as one year. We calibrate the model to the establishment-level data in
the United States. The data on the establishment distribution is taken from the Statistics
of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) dataset,16 and, the table is calculated from the 2003–2004 data.
Our strategy is to match the model’s moments without entry regulation (κ = 0) or ﬁring tax
(τ = 0) to the U.S. data and use that as the benchmark.17 Then we will experiment on the
eﬀects of the entry regulation and ﬁring tax.
We assume that the production function is
f(st,nt) = stnθ
t.
As in the standard real business cycle literature, we set β = 0.94 and θ = 0.64. Following
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), we normalize the benchmark value of w = 1. This is
achieved by setting ce so that the free-entry condition (1) holds under w = 1. This procedure
yields ce = 36.19. We also set the benchmark value of L = 0.6 in the benchmark without
entry costs or ﬁring costs, following Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). This value is motivated
by the employment rate in the U.S. Because L is an endogenous variable, this is done by
ﬁrst ﬁnding an M that satisﬁes (6) with L = 0.6, and then setting A so that (5) holds with
this M. This yields A = 1.36.
For the stochastic process of st, we take the following strategy. First, we discretize the
domain of st. In particular, we pick the grids of st so that the optimal level of employment
(without ﬁring tax) at each st corresponds to the 1/4, 1/2, and 3/4 point of the cells that are
used to tabulate the SUSB dataset.18 (For the largest cell, we pick nt = 1500.) Then we try
to match the model’s outcome to the cross-sectional properties of the data. The entrant’s
16See http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/ for more details about this dataset. The cross-sectional tables
below are created as a customized table.
17In the “Doing Business” dataset, the U.S. entry cost is not exactly zero (κ = 0.27). Because this is a
negligibly small amount, we regard this as zero in this section. In Section 6, we measure all of the κ’s as the
diﬀerence from the U.S. value of κ.
18We make sure that we have enough grids on n, so that the optimal choice is not constrained by the
discreteness of the grid.
16Data Model
1 − 4 72.04 72.04
5 − 9 14.03 14.03
10 − 19 7.32 7.32
20 − 49 4.27 4.27
50 − 99 1.37 1.37
100 − 249 0.72 0.72
250 − 499 0.16 0.16
500 − 999 0.06 0.06
1000− 0.04 0.03
Table 1: Size distribution of entrants (%), U.S. data and model
Data Model
1 − 4 14.88 16.45
5 − 9 6.72 9.84
10 − 19 5.57 4.50
20 − 49 4.91 4.50
50 − 99 4.58 4.50
100 − 249 4.16 4.50
250 − 499 3.90 4.50
500 − 999 4.25 4.50
1000− 4.21 4.50
Table 2: Exit rates (%), U.S. data and model
distribution ν(s) is set so that the size distribution of the entrants matches the data, as in
Table 1.19
We calibrate the distribution of cf, ξ(cf), to match the exit rates in the data, shown in
Table 2. We set ξ(0) = 0.8 and ξ(¯ cf) = 0.045. ¯ cf is a very large value and this, in eﬀect,
acts as the exogenous part of the decision to exit. The rest of the probability is uniformly
distributed across [0,45]. As we can see from Table 2, this procedure yields a reasonable
match with the exit pattern observed in the data.
19Within the cell, we distribute the probabilities equally. The “1000−” cell does not match the data because
of rounding (the data cell numbers add up to 100.1%).
17Data Model
Avg size of total establishments 17.6 16.7
Avg size of opening establishments 8.3 9.2
Avg size of closing establishments 9.0 9.0
Entry rate (%) 11.6 10.7
Exit rate (%) 10.2 10.7
Total JC rate (%) 15.8 16.6
JC rate by opening establishments (%) 5.5 5.9
Total JD rate (%) 14.4 16.6
JD rate by closing establishments (%) 5.2 5.8
Table 3: Summary statistics
For the transition probabilities of st, we ﬁrst assume that it follows an AR(1) process:
log(st+1) = a + ρlog(st) + ￿t+1, (7)
where ￿t+1 ∼ N(0,σ2). Then, we approximate this on the s grids, in a similar manner
to Tauchen (1986). We set ρ = 0.97. This value is motivated by the highly persistent
employment process in the U.S. manufacturing sector, as documented in Lee and Mukoyama
(2008).20 The value of σ is set so that the total job creation rate (JC rate) becomes similar
to the data.21 We set σ = 0.11. a is set at 0.035 and this brings the average size of the total
establishments close to what is seen in the data. Table 3 summarizes the statistics from the
U.S. data and the model. Table 4 depicts the size distribution of establishments in the U.S.
data and in the model.22 Given that the calibration target is only the average value (and
initial distribution), this shows a very good match.
As described in Section 2, the cross-country comparison of entry regulations and ﬁring
costs comes from the “Doing Business” dataset. The values of κ and τ in the data are
20As Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) show, the employment process and the productivity process have a
one-to-one mapping when there are no frictions.
21Becasue our model is in a steady state, the total job destruction rate (JD rate) is equal to the total job
creation rate (JC rate).
22The average size of opening establishments does not exactly match because we do not have any information
how the sizes are distributed within a cell. We put equal masses at the 1/4, 1/2, and 3/4 point of the cell,
but in the data it is likely that within-cell distribution is not uniform.
18Data Model
1 − 4 48.52 42.14
5 − 9 21.52 22.70
10 − 19 14.24 17.57
20 − 49 9.77 11.44
50 − 99 3.32 4.19
100 − 249 1.87 1.52
250 − 499 0.47 0.32
500 − 999 0.17 0.08
1000− 0.10 0.02
Table 4: Size distribution of establishments, in the U.S. data and the model (%)
described in Section 2.
4 Results
This section describes the results from our experiment. First we change the entry cost
parameter (κ) and the ﬁring cost parameter (τ) one by one, and then we vary them both at
the same time.
4.1 Entry costs
First, we analyze the eﬀect of κ. As we saw in Section 2, there is substantial variation in
κ. The smallest is seen in the U.S. (0.3) and the largest in Liberia (616.8). There are 32
countries with κ > 10 and there are 29 countries with κ < 1.
Now we analyze how the model behaves with κ = 3.4 and κ = 29.9, compared to the
benchmark. κ = 3.4 corresponds to the median value of κ in the data and κ = 29.9 is
the average value for low income countries with GNI per capita of less than 2% of the U.S.
level. Table 5 summarizes the results. We can see that a larger entry costs translate into
lower productivity through lower entry and exit rates and larger establishment sizes. The
labor supply is similar across diﬀerent κ. From (1), it is clear that a higher κ implies a
higher V e, which implies that the equilibrium wage is lower. There are two channels through







Avg size of total establishments 1.11 1.77
Avg size of opening establishments 1.12 1.90
Avg size of closing establishments 1.13 2.08
Entry/Exit rate 0.96 0.75
Total JC rate 0.99 0.95
JC rate by opening establishments 0.97 0.80
Total JD rate 0.99 0.95
JD rate by closing establishments 0.98 0.87
Table 5: Summary statistics for κ = 3.4 and κ = 29.9. All values are relative to the
benchmark.
log(st) below 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Benchmark 42.1% 82.4% 95.9% 99.6% 100.0%
κ = 29.9 39.6% 83.9% 96.5% 99.7% 100.0%
Table 6: Cumulative distribution: the fraction of establishments with a log(st) below each
speciﬁed value.
log(st) 0.52 0.77 0.92 1.22 1.48
Benchmark 5.0 10.0 15.0 35.0 45.0
κ = 29.9 10.0 17.5 27.5 45.0 45.0
Table 7: Exit thresholds: the maximum values of cf (on the grid) with which the establish-
ment decides to stay in operation at each value of log(st). (The values log(st) are not evenly
spaced because we picked the values on the grid.)
20which a lower wage translates into lower productivity. First, it reduces the incentive to exit
and keeps a low-productivity establishment in operation. This can be seen from Table 6
and Table 7. Table 6 is the cumulative distribution of log(st) in the steady state for the
benchmark (κ = 0) and κ = 29.9. That is, it shows the fraction of the establishments with
a log(st) below the speciﬁed values in the table. There are two opposing eﬀects—in addition
to the aforementioned eﬀect, a high κ implies low entry rate. This improves the productivity
distribution because entrants are less productive than the average establishment. However,
for most of the distribution (except for the very lowest part), the benchmark dominates
the κ = 29.9 distribution. Second, each establishment hires more workers. Because there
are decreasing returns to scale in labor, labor productivity decreases as each establishment
with a given s hires more workers. Quantitatively, the combined eﬀect is substantial—the
TFP (Y/Lθ) is 21% lower when κ = 29.9. This means that in countries like Afghanistan
(κ = 214.1), Burundi (κ = 103.1), Liberia (κ = 616.8), and Zimbabwe (κ = 121.1), entry
costs have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity.23 Table 7 presents the exit thresholds for
diﬀerent st. These are the maximum values of cf (on the grid) for which the establishment
decides to stay operating. The exit threshold is higher for κ = 29.9, which implies that
establishments are more likely to stay operating when κ = 29.9.
Another way of looking at a high κ is that it is acting as an investment tax. The
entry cost ce can be interpreted as a sunk investment in equipment and the structure of the
establishment. Increasing κ taxes this investment behavior, and reduces the output-labor
ratio.
4.2 Firing costs
Next we analyze the ﬁring costs. In Section 2, we saw that this cost also exhibits a lot of
variation. In the U.S., the cost is zero. In 63 countries, more than 1 year’s worth of wages
23Barseghyan’s (2008) regression results indicate that an increase in entry costs of 80% of annual income
per capita lowers output per worker by 29%. In our model, imposing an additional entry cost of as much as
one year’s wage (κ = 1) decreases Y/L by 1%. This points to a possibility that our model does not capture
some channels through which the entry cost aﬀects productivity.







Avg size of total establishments 1.06 1.09
Avg size of opening establishments 0.81 0.77
Avg size of closing establishments 1.09 1.15
Entry/Exit rate 0.94 0.89
Total JC rate 0.54 0.47
JC rate by opening establishments 0.72 0.64
Total JD rate 0.54 0.47
JD rate by closing establishments 0.97 0.94
Table 8: Summary statistics for τ = 0.7 and τ = 1.2. All values are relative to the benchmark.
has to be paid to ﬁre a worker. In 15 countries, it is more than 2 years. In Bolivia and
Venezuela, it is not possible to ﬁre workers. In Zimbabwe, ﬁring a worker requires more than
8 years of wages as the ﬁring cost.
Table 8 summarizes the results of the experiment with τ = 0.7 and τ = 1.2.24 τ = 0.7
corresponds to the median value in the data and τ = 1.2 corresponds to the average value for
the low income countries. Here, productivity is lower largely due to the lack of reallocation
of workers from unproductive establishments to productive establishments. The correlation
coeﬃcient between log(st) and log(nt) is 1.00 when τ = 0, and it drops to 0.95 when τ = 1.2.
24Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) also consider the eﬀect of a ﬁring cost. Their results (their Table 3)
indicate that average productivity falls by 2% and output falls by 5% when a ﬁring tax that is equivalent to
one year’s wage is imposed. When the same amount of ﬁring tax is imposed, our model predicts about a 4%
decline in average productivity and a 10% decline in output. This diﬀerence in results is due to the diﬀerence
in calibration—in particular, in our model one period is one year and in their model one period is ﬁve years.
Thus, it is possible that our establishments adjust employment more frequently and pay the ﬁring tax more
often. Veracierto (2001) also observed that the period length matters. Additionally, in their calibration, an
entrant is much smaller than incumbents, compared to our calibration. Therefore, their establishments spend
more time expanding, during which they do not pay the ﬁring tax. The diﬀerence in size comes from the fact
that they calibrate the model using a dataset from the U.S. manufacturing sector, whereas our calibration is
based on all sectors in the U.S. economy.
22Job creation and job destruction are substantially lower, relative to the benchmark.
Interestingly, the size of an opening establishment is smaller with a larger τ, despite a
lower wage. The establishments are forward-looking, and they avoid expanding because they
would have to pay the ﬁring tax when they shrink again.
Another interesting observation is that L changes substantially with the ﬁring cost. In
this model, the wage w is determined by the free-entry condition (1), and therefore reﬂects the
future proﬁt opportunities for an entering establishment. Thus, the substitution eﬀect for the
consumer, which works through the change in the wage, reacts to the entering establishment’s
future proﬁts. That is, when the opening establishment’s future proﬁts fall, then the wage
falls and the labor supply L declines. The wealth eﬀect works in the opposite direction
for L, and is related to the productivity of the average establishment. Here, the entering
establishments face a larger eﬀect of the ﬁring tax than an average establishment, because
the entering establishments are relatively less productive and therefore more likely to exit
in the near future. Because they have to pay the ﬁring tax when they exit, they are more
heavily taxed than an average establishment. Therefore, the substitution eﬀect prevails in
determining L. For the same reason, the exit rate (and therefore the entry rate also) reacts
substantially to the ﬁring tax—it taxes the act of exiting.
To see this, in Table 9 we alternatively assume that the exiting establishments are not
subject to the ﬁring cost. There, L slightly increases with τ from τ = 0.7 to τ = 1.2 and
the entry/exit rates increase with τ. Comparing this result with the baseline experiment
(Table 8), we can see that particularly for a large value of τ, the ﬁring tax upon exiting
is an important channel through which τ aﬀects output and productivity in the baseline
experiment.25







Avg size of total establishments 1.06 1.10
Avg size of opening establishments 0.83 0.81
Avg size of closing establishments 1.11 1.19
Entry/Exit rate 1.00 1.09
Total JC rate 0.55 0.49
JC rate by opening establishments 0.79 0.74
Total JD rate 0.55 0.49
JD rate by closing establishments 1.05 1.09
Table 9: Summary statistics for τ = 0.7 and τ = 1.2, when τ = 0 for exiting establishments.
All values are relative to the benchmark.
















Figure 4: Total Factor Productivity in the model and the data.
24κ = 3.4 κ = 29.9







Avg size of total establishments 1.16 1.83
Avg size of opening establishments 0.90 1.40
Avg size of closing establishments 1.23 2.24
Entry/Exit rate 0.89 0.71
Total JC rate 0.53 0.44
JC rate by opening establishments 0.69 0.55
Total JD rate 0.53 0.44
JD rate by closing establishments 0.95 0.87
Table 10: Results for combinations of κ and τ. All values are relative to the benchmark.
4.3 Both combined
In reality, both entry costs and ﬁring costs are present, and both barriers tend to be higher
in poor countries. Moreover, the combination of the both barriers can generate a larger eﬀect
than a single barrier.
Table 10 repeats the same exercise as Table 5 and Table 8 with combined frictions.
One can see how the eﬀects are combined. For example, having both κ = 29.9 and τ = 1.2
simultaneously would reduce the productivity Y/Lθ to 0.75 of the benchmark. This is smaller
than when κ = 29.9 and τ = 0 (0.79) or τ = 1.2 and κ = 0 (0.93). The combined eﬀect
is essentially multiplicative—0.79 × 0.93 = 0.73 is only slightly smaller than 0.75. The two
mechanisms do not either amplify or mitigate each other’s eﬀect.
In the following, we take the levels of τ and κ from the data and conduct the experiment for
all countries. TFP in the data is constructed following and updating Hall and Jones (1999).
25Samaniego (2006a) is the ﬁrst to point out that the eﬀect of a ﬁring cost can diﬀer considerably depending
on whether the exiting establishments/ﬁrms have to pay the ﬁring cost.
25We updated their measure of TFP using data from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009)
(output per worker and investment), Barro and Lee (2000) (average school attainment) and




where Y denotes aggregate output, K denotes aggregate capital, H denotes the labor aggre-
gate adjusted for human capital, and α is the capital share.
Figure 4 compares the TFP from the model and the data. They are positively correlated,
but TFP’s dispersion in the data is substantially larger than in the model.
In Table 11 we compare the results of the model to the data by regressing the data on
the model. The table reports the results in terms of TFP, output per worker, and entry rate
for three cases (both κ and τ, κ only, and τ only).
If our model accounted perfectly for the data, we would have an R2 of 1, an intercept of
0, and a slope of 1. From Table 11, we see that the model accounts for 27% of the variation in
TFP (its R2), while having a slope of 0.17 (not reported in the table), which is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. In terms of the other variables—output per worker and entry rate—the
model explains 27% and 8%, respectively, of the data variation as shown by the diﬀerent R2
for the full model (with both frictions). In terms of the relative importance of frictions, it
is clear that for almost every variable (except for the entry rate) the entry cost κ is more
important than the ﬁring cost τ in accounting for the variation in the data. Given that
κ is the cost that is directly associated with entry, it is somewhat surprising that τ has a
larger impact here, in terms of R2. In Table 11, we also report the results for the ﬁrst two
regressions excluding Zimbabwe and Liberia, which are clear outliers in Figure 4. The results
are similar without these outliers.
Finally, we calculate the model’s outcomes for the average values of diﬀerent income
groups, and to the U.S., in Table 12. We divide the countries into four income categories
following the World Bank’s categories—High Income Countries (HIC), Upper Middle Income
Countries (UMIC), Lower Middle Income Countries (LMIC), and Low Income Countries
26Complete Sample No Outliers
Variable Frictions R2 N R2 N
TFP (κ,τ) 0.27 97 0.26 95
κ 0.25 0.34
τ 0.08 0.06
Y/L (κ,τ) 0.27 97 0.38 95
κ 0.22 0.39
τ 0.11 0.11
Entry Rate (κ,τ) 0.08 73
κ 0.03
τ 0.07
Table 11: The results from regressions comparing the data and model outcomes. The regres-
sion is: Data = a0 + a1 × Model + ￿. N: sample size. The regression without outliers does
not use Zimbabwe and Liberia, clear outliers in Figure 4 in the bottom left corner. For the
entry rate, Zimbabwe and Liberia are not in the sample for the original regression.
27U.S. HIC UMIC LMIC LIC
κ = 0.26 κ = 1.4 κ = 3.4 κ = 6.5 κ = 29.9
τ = 0.0 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.8 τ = 0.9 τ = 1.2
Y 1.00 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.71
L 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.55
w 1.00 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.73
TFP (Y/Lθ) 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.75
Avg size of total establishments 16.8 18.4 19.4 21.0 30.5
Avg size of opening establishments 9.3 7.8 8.2 8.8 13.0
Avg size of closing establishments 9.0 10.3 11.1 12.3 20.1
Entry/Exit rate (%) 10.7 9.8 9.5 9.1 7.6
Output per eﬀective worker (data) 1 0.93 0.52 0.27 0.12
TFP (data) 1 0.93 0.72 0.47 0.33
Avg size of total establ. (data) 17.6 16 171.1 270 755.6
Entry rate (data) 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07
Table 12: Results for various income levels (Y and TFP are relative to the U.S. levels)
(LIC). Roughly speaking, a country is classiﬁed as a HIC if its GNI per capita is higher than
25% of the U.S. GNI per capita, a UMIC if its GNI per capita falls between 8% and 25% of
the U.S. level, a LMIC if its GNI per capita falls between 2% and 8% of the U.S. level, and a
LIC if its GNI per capita is below 2% of the U.S. level. Then we calculate the average value
of κ and τ for each income group, and run the experiments using these average values. Table
12 is presented here mainly for comparison to the results in the next section.
5 Incorporating capital stock
So far, we have considered a model in which output is produced with only labor input. In
this section, we incorporate capital stock explicitly into the model. The ﬁrms own the capital
stock kt. The adjustment of the capital stock may be subject to adjustment costs, given by a
function ψ(kt+1,kt), except for the period in which the establishment enters. The investment
is not perfectly reversible—the scrap value of capital when exiting is only a fraction γ ∈ (0,1)
of its original value. The establishment’s production function is now f(s,k,n) = skαnθ. Here,
s is the idiosyncratic productivity level and n is labor input. We assume that α,θ ∈ (0,1) and
28α+θ < 1 to maintain decreasing returns to scale with respect to k and n at the establishment












{f(st,nt,kt) − wnt − τwmaxh0,nt−1 − nti − it − ψ(kt+1,kt) + βW(st,nt,kt+1)},
with the standard law of motion for capital
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it,
where it is investment at time t. We assume free entry. After paying the entry cost, the
entrant draws an initial productivity and invests in initial capital, which is not subject to
adjustment costs. We assume that the entrant eﬀectively draws cf = 0 for the ﬁrst period.
The function ψ(kt+1,kt) is assumed to be quadratic in the form λk(i/k)2, where the parameter
λ determines the adjustment cost friction. We set the other parameters as: α = 0.27, θ = 0.64
and δ = 0.08. The process for st is assumed to be AR(1), as in (7). In our benchmark
case, we set the parameters for the adjustment cost, productivity persistence, and volatility
parameters to those estimated by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) for the manufacturing
sector in the U.S. In particular, we set λ = 0.0975, ρ = 0.885, and σ2 = 0.235. The scrap
value of capital is calibrated to 40% (γ = 0.4), as estimated by Ramey and Shapiro (2001).
The long-term mean of productivity, a in (7), is set so that the average size of the incumbent
ﬁrm from the model matches that in the data, as measured by the number of employees.
The initial distribution of st is calibrated so that the size of the entrant from the model
matches the corresponding number in the data. The distribution of cf is calibrated so that
the average exit rate in the model matches the data.
With these parameters in hand, we perform our experiments. Given the additional com-
putational burden introduced by having capital in the model, we group countries together
and perform the numerical exercise on these groups.
29Income Level U.S. HIC UMIC LMIC LIC
κ = 0.26 κ = 1.4 κ = 3.4 κ = 6.5 κ = 29.9
τ = 0 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.8 τ = 0.9 τ = 1.2
Y 1.00 0.27 0.19 0.16 0.10
L 0.60 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.09
K 1.00 0.34 0.25 0.22 0.14
w 1.00 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.43
TFP (Y/(KαL(1−α))) 1.00 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.71
Avg size of total establishments 30.60 188.02 326.20 524.90 1165.90
Avg size of opening establishments 5.80 22.10 37.70 56.80 154.30
Avg size of closing establishments 30.60 9.05 15.20 24.60 55.00
Entry/Exit rate (%) 16.97 5.36 4.78 4.60 4.50
Output per eﬀective worker (data) 1 0.93 0.52 0.27 0.12
Capital per eﬀective worker (data) 1 1.04 0.38 0.21 0.06
TFP (data) 1 0.93 0.72 0.47 0.33
Avg size of total establ. (data) 17.6 16 171.1 270 755.6
Entry rate (data) 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07
Table 13: Model without capital adjustment frictions (Y , K, TFP (both model and data),
and per capita GNI are relative to the U.S. level)
First we perform the same experiment in an environment in which capital is freely mobile.
That is, we set λ = 0 and γ = 1 while keeping the other parameters constant. Then we
calculate the benchmark case with an adjustment cost. The comparison across these two
cases provides us with a measure of the total eﬀects of the “capital mobility friction” in
economies with diﬀerent κ and τ.
Tables 13 and 14 report the results of both experiments.26 In both experiments, TFP
falls monotonically with larger κ and τ. The magnitude of decline is larger with capital
adjustment costs, highlighting the importance of capital adjustment across establishments.
With capital adjustment costs, TFP falls substantially (by 34%) when we move from the U.S.
level of (κ,τ) to the LIC level of (κ,τ). Without the capital adjustment costs, this number
26The median values of κ are 1.2 for HIC, 1.7 for UMIC, 5.5 for LMIC, and 8.4 for LIC. For τ, the median
values are 0.5 for HIC, 0.7 for UMIC, 0.7 for LMIC, and 0.7 for LIC.
30Income Level U.S. HIC UMIC LMIC LIC
κ = 0.26 κ = 1.4 κ = 3.4 κ = 6.5 κ = 29.9
τ = 0 τ = 0.7 τ = 0.8 τ = 0.9 τ = 1.2
Y 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.74 0.57
L 0.60 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.50
K 1.00 1.48 1.34 1.17 0.91
w 1.00 0.61 0.54 0.49 0.39
TFP (Y/(KαL(1−α))) 1.00 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.66
Avg size of total establishments 15.60 129.10 262.40 456.10 1214.10
Avg size of opening establishments 8.04 32.70 48.40 72.80 206.60
Avg size of closing establishments 3.04 6.10 12.30 21.40 57.20
Entry/Exit rate (%) 12.30 4.53 4.51 4.51 4.50
Output per eﬀective worker (data) 1 0.93 0.52 0.27 0.12
Capital per eﬀective worker (data) 1 1.04 0.38 0.21 0.06
TFP (data) 1 0.93 0.72 0.47 0.33
Avg size of total establ. (data) 17.6 16 171.1 270 755.6
Entry rate (data) 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07
Table 14: Model with capital adjustment frictions (Y , K, TFP (both model and data), and
per capita GNI are relative to the U.S. level)
31is 29%.27
In both cases, the wage falls substantially, lowering L and increasing the average estab-
lishment size. The wealth eﬀect counteracts this force, and it is particularly strong in the case
with adjustment cost. This can induce a non-monotonic behavior in L (and K), as shown in
Table 14. Output and employment fall much more with larger κ and τ when adjustment costs
are absent, reﬂecting a smaller wealth eﬀect in this case. The wage decline is larger than in
the case without capital, mainly reﬂecting that when capital is incorporated into the model,
production becomes closer to constant returns to scale. This is also reﬂected in the dramatic
change in average size in reaction to the increase in frictions. In both Tables 13 and 14, the
entry/exit rate changes substantially when frictions increase from the U.S. level to the HIC
level, but it does not change much with further increases in frictions. This is mainly due to
how the ﬁxed operating cost cf is distributed in the model—the distribution of cf reﬂects the
pattern of exit rates in the cross section of the U.S. economy. Recall, from Section 3.4, that
we set the distribution of cf to match the patten of exit rates across diﬀerent establishment
sizes. In order to match the fact that many large establishments exit every year, we assume
that with a 4.5% probability each establishment is hit by a shock that requires a very large
value of cf to be paid in order to continue operating. This 4.5% acts as the exogenous com-
ponent of the exit rate, and the entry/exit rate cannot fall below this rate. Thus, once the
entry/exit rate gets close to this level due to larger frictions, a further increase in frictions
does not have a large impact on the entry/exit rate. The aggregate capital stock K may or
may not increase with frictions when capital adjustment costs exist—with adjustment costs,
an “ineﬃcient” establishment tends to hold too much capital and an “eﬃcient” establishment
tends to hold too little capital, and an increase in frictions exacerbates this distortion in both
categories.
27This turns out to be larger than the TFP eﬀect in our benchmark model without capital. If the capital is
rented by the establishment, rather than owned, a model with capital and no adjustment cost is reduced to the
benchmark model with a higher labor share. The current model is not directly comparable to the benchmark
model because the exit process is also aﬀected by the frictions (kt enters into the beneﬁt of exiting). Here,
the entry/exit rate is signiﬁcantly more aﬀected by the entry barriers and ﬁring costs than in the benchmark
model.
32The entry barriers and ﬁring costs have larger impacts on TFP when there are capital
adjustment costs. The capital adjustment costs hinder the reallocation of capital to a pro-
ductive establishment. When capital adjustment costs are absent, the friction to the labor
reallocation can be “substituted” by the capital reallocation—more capital can be allocated
to the productive establishments. With capital adjustment costs it is also diﬃcult to reallo-
cate capital, and the productivity eﬀects of frictions are strengthened.
6 Comparison to the cross-country micro data
In Section 4, we found that entry barriers aﬀect productivity partially through larger ﬁrm
size, and ﬁring costs aﬀect productivity through reduced worker turnover. One natural
question is: are these predictions consistent with the cross-country ﬁrm/establishment level
micro data? As Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2007) emphasize, it is extremely
diﬃcult to obtain cross-country comparable micro-level datasets at the ﬁrm/establishment
level. Here, we sketch some suggestive evidence.
There are relatively more cross-country comparison studies (including developing coun-
tries) of ﬁrm size than of turnovers. Tybout (2000), based largely on Liedholm and Mead
(1987), argues that ﬁrm size tends to be smaller in poorer countries. This seems to be at
odds with our mechanism. However, Liedholm and Mead’s (1987) study includes the infor-
mal sector, while our model describes only the formal sector. Informal ﬁrms tend to be small
and the informal sector is larger in poor countries, thus the existence of the informal sector
biases the size-income relationship in the positive direction.
The recent studies by Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2007) and Alfaro, Charlton
and Kanczuk (2008) look at only the formal sector, and therefore these studies seem to be
more comparable to our model. They indeed found that there is a negative relationship
between ﬁrm size and income across countries. Thus, these studies are qualitatively consistent
with the results of our model.
To assess whether this prediction is also consistent quantitatively, we compare the out-









































































Figure 5: Average establishment size, variance of establishment size, business density, and
entry rate in the model and the data. Data Source: Alfaro, Charlton and Kanczuk (2008).
34comes of our model (with κ and τ taken from the Doing Business dataset28) with the data
from two sources. In terms of the average and the variance of establishment size, we com-
pare the model’s outcome to the data in Alfaro, Charlton and Kanczuk (2008). The data
on business density and entry rate are those reported by the 2008 World Bank Group En-
trepreneurship Survey and Database, where the business density refers to the number of
formal establishments per 1000 workers.
The model is consistent with the data in terms of the variation in the average estab-
lishment size, business density, and entry rates (with correlations of 0.53, 0.47, and 0.29,
respectively). The model misses the variation in the variance of establishment size across
countries. The fact that the model cannot reproduce the variance of size across countries
is a direct consequence of the timing assumption of entry. Because there is no selection of
establishments at the point of entry (the entrants observe productivity after paying the entry
cost), diﬀerent entry costs does not generate a large diﬀerence in productivity distribution.
D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2010) assumes that an establishment observes productivity
before the entry into the formal sector, there is a selection upon entry, and the outcome
regarding the variance of the size is closer to that seen in the data.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluated the eﬀects of entry costs and ﬁring costs on income and produc-
tivity. We used the World Bank’s “Doing Business” dataset and quantitatively analyzed a
general equilibrium industry-dynamics model based on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
A high entry cost reduces productivity through the wage—the wage is lower in an economy
with a higher entry cost, and it keeps a low productivity plant in operation and also makes
the average establishment size too large. A high ﬁring cost reduces reallocation of labor from
low-productivity establishments to high-productivity establishments.
We found that the quantitative eﬀects of entry costs and ﬁring costs are modest for most
28Here, because the U.S. value of κ is not exactly zero, we subtract the U.S. value of κ from the original
value of κ for each country.
35of the countries. The linear regression of the data on the model’s prediction accounts for
27% of the cross-sectional variation in total factor productivity. Moving the level of entry
costs and ﬁring costs from the U.S. level to that of the average of low income countries (the
countries with Gross National Income below 2% of the U.S. level) reduces TFP by 27% in the
model without capital and by 34% in the model with capital and capital adjustment costs.
We focused on the costs that aﬀect the mobility of labor. Although the main part of our
model uses labor as the only input, we also extended the model to incorporate the capital
stock. We found that when capital adjustment costs exist, the eﬀect of entry costs and ﬁring
costs can be substantial.
We made an attempt to compare these predictions directly to the micro-level data. Most
of the results are qualitatively consistent with the data, but the model only captures a part
of the quantitative variations that are observed in the data. Further quantitative evaluations
of richer models are left for the future research.
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